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1 Introduction
Experimental Economics offers abundant evidence -see Fehr and Schmidt (2002) and
Camerer (2003) for excellent surveys- that contradicts the joint hypothesis that all agents
are rational and motivated only by their own material interest. In a Dictator ‘game’ ex-
periment, for instance, one subject is provisionally endowed with some amount of money
and must decide how much of that money to transfer to another, anonymous, participant;
the ‘game’ finishing then. Clearly, a rational and materially interested chooser would not
transfer anything. Contrary to that prediction, a significant proportion of the participants
give something, many times as much as half of the stake.
Why does giving occur? The dictator game is so simple that an argument based on
rationality failures seems rather convoluted. Introspection points to different motivational
forces that material interest. This paper investigates formally such motivations in order
to offer a rational choice explanation of subjects’ behavior in this and many other experi-
ments. That is, this paper keeps the standard assumption of rationality and relaxes that of
selfish, homo economicus preferences.
Importantly, the theory here proposed does not only seek to explain why people co-
operate or behave generously towards others, but also why people punish others contrary
to their material interest, as happens in Ultimatum game experiments. This game has the
same structure as the dictator game except that now the second player (the ‘responder’)
has a say and may accept or reject the first mover’s proposal. The proposal is implemented
if the responder accepts it, whereas both players get zero money if it is rejected. Clearly,
the rejection of a strictly positive offer goes against material interest. However, actual
responders usually reject offers of less than one quarter of the stake and even more. As
the dictator’s problem, the responder’s problem is so simple that rejection cannot be the
result of rationality failures but of emotional forces different that material joy.
Human societies are endowed with social norms that people internalize through the
education process. As a result, they acquire certain emotional responses to others’ and
one’s behavior. Self-conscious emotions like embarrassment, guilt or shame trigger when
oneself deviates from an internalized norm. In turn, people feel aggressive emotions like
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anger when another player violates a norm that one has hitherto respected. These two
classes of painful sensations shape human preferences -other things constant, one prefers
not to suffer them- and affect human behavior in two distinctive ways. First, people adjust
their choices to avoid the activation of such negative emotions. Second, specific behav-
ioral impulses appear associated with such sensations once they get triggered (Frijda,
1986). The action tendency of anger, for instance, is to punish the deviator.
As a result, these two classes of emotions crucially shape norm compliance and pun-
ishment in human societies. More precisely, people respect norms to avoid bad feelings
(internal punishment), external sanctions (external punishment), or both, whereas, in ad-
dition, human punishment is many times driven by anger and, therefore, has an important
component of revenge-seeking.
From our point of view, the generosity and the Pareto-damaging behavior that (some)
subjects exhibit in the Dictator and Ultimatum games, respectively, may be explained by
the theory sketched in the previous discussion. The argument is simple: (Some) subjects
have internalized a specific norm of fairness or distributive justice which they take to
the lab, and then their emotions make them act according to the norm and punish trans-
gressors. Intuitively, these principled subjects also affect the behavior of the remaining,
self-interested, agents which may find profitable to respect the norm if they risk being
sanctioned otherwise. This paper provides a formalization of this theory.
Importantly, ours is a model of reciprocity in the sense that principled players respect
the norm only if they expect sufficiently others to respect it as well, and they hurt trans-
gressors. More than that, it model strong reciprocity (Gintis, 2000) because principled
agents obey the norm and punish deviators even contrary to their material interest.
The norm we posit (the E-norm) praises to act so as to achieve a fair distribution of
material welfare, assuming that all agents respect the norm. We also postulate that people
see fairness as a combination of social efficiency and Rawlsian or maximin concerns for
the worst off agent, and that social efficiency receives a relatively higher weight. This
implies, for instance, that distribution (5, 0) is more fair than (1, 1).
We analyze the working of the model in different strategic settings like the Dictator
game, Cournot game, Ultimatum game, Trust game, and the Best-Shot game, among
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others, and show that it gives precise predictions and, indeed, is more consistent with
experimental evidence than the conventional homo economicus model.
Although this may be debatable, we also believe that our model has several advantages
over other models of social preferences and reciprocity, among which we may cite some.
First, and contrary to some other models, it is a model of path-dependent preferences
in that people do not only care about the material consequences of previous or present
choices but also whether such choices constitute a deviation from an internalized norm.
This appears to be largely consistent with experimental evidence -again, consult, Fehr and
Schmidt (2002) or Camerer (2003). Second, and consistent with the extensive evidence
provided by Charness and Rabin (2002), the model predicts two apparently contradictory
phenomena: (i) Many subjects have both social efficiency and maximin concerns, and (ii)
Many subjects engage in Pareto-damaging behavior to punish deviators.
Further, the model is very general: One may apply it to understand why people respect
dressing norms, codes of etiquette, or communication norms like ‘do not lie’, which other
models have difficulties to explain. Last, but not least, it is relatively simple and precise
-i.e., it does not predict a multiplicity of equilibrium strategy profiles in many games.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We devote the next section to sur-
vey some of the literature on social preferences. To distinguish the effects of prosocial and
aggressive emotions on behavior, section 3 first describes prosocial preferences and the
E-norm. In turn, section 4 applies this model to different experimental games, comparing
theoretical predictions with experimental data. Section 5 adds aggressive emotions to the
model and studies other experimental games. Throughout sections 4 and 5, we point out
the differences between our approach and that of other models. Finally, section 6 proposes
some possible extensions and concludes.
2 Other Models of Social Preferences and Reciprocity
However the pervasiveness of the homo economicus hypothesis, the idea that people have
social emotions has an old history in Economics. Edgeworth (1881) proposed a simple
model of altruism in which an individual’s utility is a weighted sum of her and others’
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material payoffs. This linear formulation is rich enough to express many ideas. To de-
scribe it in game theoretical terms, assume for simplicity that player i’s material payoff at
terminal node z coincides with her money earnings xi(z). Player i’s utility at z is then
Ui(z) = xi(z) +
∑
k 6=i
αik(z) · xk(z), (1)
where αik(z) ∈ [−1, 1] for any i, k, and z. Of course, the homo economicus hypothesis
entails αik(z) = 0 for any i, k and z. On the opposite, it is said that player i is altruistic
towards player k at z if αik(z) > 0, and spiteful towards k if αik(z) < 0.
In the simplest formulation within this linear framework, αik(z) is the same constant
number for any k and z. This means that the sign and intensity of our sentiments or
emotions towards the others do not depend on their acts, qualities, and beliefs, or on the
actual or potential distributions of material payoffs.
In an important and pioneering paper, Rabin (1993) put into question the previous
formulation, providing an alternative model. Rabin pointed out that the sign of our sen-
timents is conditional: ”[...] the same people who are altruistic to other altruistic people
are also motivated to hurt those who hurt them.”1 Moreover, he posited that the sign of
our sentiments depends on our beliefs about the others’ intentions.
Roughly speaking, player B’s intentions are her expectations about the terminal dis-
tribution of material payoffs to be reached in the game. Take then any two-player game in
normal form and suppose that A believes that B’s intentions are (x∗A, x
∗
B). B’s intentions
are kind (unkind) to A if x∗A is larger (smaller) than the equitable payoff -i.e., the average
of the maximum and minimum A’s payments within the set of Pareto efficient allocations
that, according to A, B believes to be reachable. In a somewhat analogous way, B is kind
(unkind) to A if she expects A to get a higher (lower) payoff than what B believes to be
A’s equitable payoff. Now, a player’s utility is the sum of her expected material payoff
and a reciprocity component that is bounded above and below,2 and which Rabin uses to
model conditional altruism: A’s reciprocity component is positive if A treats B kindly (un-
kindly) when she believes that B’s intentions are kind (unkind). Further, A’s reciprocity
1Rabin (1993, p. 1281), italics in the original.
2Hence, the bigger the material payoffs, the less the players’ behavior reflects their concern for fairness.
4
component collapses to zero if x∗A is just equal to the equitable payoff.
Rabin (1993) resort to Psychological Game Theory -Geanakoplos et al. (1989)- to
model the idea that beliefs about the other player’s intentions affect utility, and proposes,
in line with that theory, an equilibrium concept in which players’ strategies are optimal
given their beliefs which, moreover, turn out to be correct.3 Nevertheless, his solution
concept is problematic in sequential games where non-optimizing behavior may be pre-
scribed out of the equilibrium path. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) extend Rabin’s
approach to n-player extensive form games and provide a solution concept that follows
the logic of subgame perfect equilibrium.
It follows from Rabin’s definition of the equitable payoff, the reference point that
players use to judge whether intentions are kind or not, that the whole set of alloca-
tions -including those outcomes that the other player does not intend to reach- might
affect one’s behavior, something that is generally compatible with experimental evidence.
On the other hand, two assumptions of Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) are largely incompatible with experimental evidence. First, the equitable payoff is
independent of the opponent’s expected payoffs. Thus, if (2.1, 0) and (2, 2) are the only
Pareto efficient material allocations and the second player’s intentions are (2, 2) -i.e., he
has unkind intentions towards the first player- then the first player might be willing to hurt
the second one, if possible. A second shortcoming is that dummy players, which cannot
have kind or unkind intentions, are never treated kindly (or unkindly). For instance, both
models predict no giving in the dictator game.4
Falk and Fischbacher (forthcoming) propose another extension of Rabin (1993) to ex-
tensive form games that avoids those two problems. In it, a player’s utility at a terminal
node f is the sum of the material payoff at f and the reciprocity utilities that she gets
at all her decision nodes that precede f -players may weight such reciprocity utilities
differently, thus introducing heterogeneity. The chooser’s reciprocity utility at decision
node n depends on her beliefs at n about the opponents’ intentions. As in Rabin (1993),
kind intentions trigger ceteris paribus reward whereas unkind intentions trigger punish-
3Note well that, sensibly, beliefs are fixed exogenously and are not an object of choice.
4Nevertheless, appendix A of Rabin (1993) extends the main model to avoid this problem.
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ment. Contrary to Rabin (1993), however, intentions are kind (unkind) at n when the
other player gets a lower (higher) expected material payoff than oneself’s.
Another key distinction from Rabin’s model is that the intensity with which agent A’s
wishes to punish or reward B depends on the whole set of outcomes that A believes that
B believes to be reachable. Roughly, A’s disposition to reward B lessens if A believes
that, although B has kind intentions, B could have given more to A at any other available
alternative. Conversely, A’s disposition to punish B lessens if A believes that, although B
has unkind intentions, B could not have given more to A at any other alternative without
putting himself in a disadvantageous position -an ”unreasonable sacrifice” by player B.
Models using Psychological Game Theory are based on the interesting idea that social
emotions depend on the motives we attribute to others. However, they share the drawback
of being rather complex. Levine (1998) improves tractability by assuming that people
are concerned about the opponent’s type and not about his intentions. A typical agent A’s
type is completely specified by a number aA ∈ (−1, 1), which signals whether someone is
benevolent (aA > 0) or malevolent (aB < 0). Given this, and using the linear framework
of equation (1), αAB(z) depends positively on aA and aB. For example, even if player
A is benevolent, she may become spiteful (αAB < 0) towards a sufficiently malevolent
player B. Since the type of each player is private information, there is a possibility for
signalling, that is, players’ actions may reveal how benevolent (or malevolent) they are,
and their opponents care about this. In that way, non-chosen moves may be as important as
the moves one actually chooses, something that, as we have already remarked, is sensible
and consistent with experimental evidence. One drawback of this model is that it renders
a multiplicity of equilibrium strategy profiles in most games.
The appendix of Charness and Rabin (2002) offers another model of reciprocity. They
introduce a demerit profile d = (d1, ..., dn), where dj ∈ [0, 1] for all j, and nonnegative
parameters λ, δ, b, k, f where λ ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1). Player i’s utility function is
Ui = (1− λ) · xi + λ[δ ·min(xi,min
k 6=i
{xk + bdk})
+(1− δ)(xi +
∑
k 6=i
max{1− kdk, 0} · xk)− f
∑
k 6=i
dk · xk].
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The key aspect of these preferences is that the greater is dk for k 6= i, the less weight
player i places on player k’s material payoff. In fact, if f and dk are sufficiently large then
player i wishes to hurt player k.
In order to model reciprocity, Charness and Rabin endogenize each demerit dj to
make it dependent on player j’s strategy. Roughly speaking, they define gi(si, s−i, d) as a
correspondence selecting those values of λ ∈ [0, 1] such that si is a best response to s−i
given demerits d. Each gi(si, s−i, d) is then compared with an exogenous ‘selflessness
standard’ λ∗ -to be interpreted as the weight that a decent person ought to put on social
welfare. The intuition is that if max{g |g ∈ gi(si, s−i, d)} < λ∗ then other players resent
player i’s choice. Given all this, strategy profile s is a ‘reciprocal-fairness equilibrium’
(RFE) if there exists a profile d and a correspondence gi(s, d) for all i such that, for all
i, si is a best response to s−i given d, and di = max[λ∗ − gi, 0] -i.e., the demerit profile
must be consistent with the profile of strategies.
The model of Charness and Rabin (2002) presents several drawbacks like its com-
plexity, the existence of many free parameters, the lack of heterogeneity in players’ utility
functions, and the fact that it is unclear how to compute utilities if there are multiple equi-
librium demerit profiles. Charness and Rabin (2002, 851) do not see their model as “[...]
being primarily useful in its current form for calibrating experimental data, but rather as
providing progress in conceptualizing what we observe in experiments.” In this respect,
and because several of their intuitions are somehow present in our model, one may see it
as a tractable continuation of their research.
All above mentioned utility models are non-consequentialistic or non-separable (Camerer,
2003) because a player’s utility at terminal node z does not only depend on the distribu-
tion of material payoffs at z. Other models are consequentialistic or separable. Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), for instance, model inequity aversion.
Two key hypothesis characterize Fehr and Schmidt (1999) -we use equation (1) to
describe them. First, αAB(z) is a positive parameter if A gets a larger material payoff
than B, that is, if xA(z) > xB(z). Second, αAB(z) is a negative parameter if A gets a
smaller material payoff than B -in other words, agents are envious. In addition, players
are heterogeneous regarding the inequity aversion parameters, and for any individual, the
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envy parameter is larger than the parameter measuring advantageous inequity aversion.
Analogously, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) posit two basic assumptions -we use again
equation (1). Roughly speaking, αAB(z) is positive (negative) if A’s material payoff is
above (below) the average material payoff at z. Note well that these two conditions
hold independently of how big B’s material payoff is. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) also
assume that individuals are heterogeneous.
To finish, Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Charness and Rabin (2002) also offer
consequentialistic models to explain evidence coming from some experiments. Char-
ness and Rabin (2002), for example, hypothesize that αAB(z) is positive and, moreover,
αAB(z) > αAC(z) for any other player C if B happens to be the worst off agent. That is,
players are altruists with Rawlsian maximin concerns.5
3 A Model of Normative Preferences
Material Games and Norms. Consider any extensive form game of perfect recall. Let
N = {1, ..., n} denote the set of players, and u(z) = {u1(z), ..., un(z)} the vector of play-
ers’ payoffs at terminal node z. Players are rational, that is, each one seeks to maximize
her own payoff given her beliefs about other players’ strategy.
In addition, let x(z) = {x1(z), ..., xn(z)} denote the vector of material payoffs at z.
That is, xi(z) represents the cardinal utility that player i gets from consumption, money,
and effort exerted along the history of z. Nevertheless, in lab games -our main concern
here- it seems safe to simplify and assume that subjects’ material welfare just coincides
with earned money. Throughout the paper, hence, the terms ‘monetary payment’ and
‘material payoff’ are synonyms.
Material payoffs and payoffs are not the same thing -i.e., generally xi(z) 6= ui(z) for
any player i and node z. However, the researcher may initially have information only
about the material game, that is, the researcher may know xi(z) for any i and z but not
ui(z). We propose in what follows a theory on how to derive any ui(z) from the data
5When mentioning Charness and Rabin (2002) in what follows, and unless otherwise noted, we refer to
their model of quasi-maximin preferences and not to the previously described reciprocity model.
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contained in the material game.
Definition 1 A norm Ψ is a nonempty correspondence Ψ : h→ A(h) that applies on any
information set h of any material game. Action a ∈ A(h) is said to be consistent with
norm Ψ if a ∈ Ψ(h). Otherwise, a is a deviation from Ψ.
One may interpret a norm as a prescription indicating how one ought to behave at any
conceivable situation at which one may be called to move. To put it like that, a norm
orders the available actions at any information set: Some are commendable and others are
not. We provide below an example of an specific norm: The E-norm.
Preferences. To simplify matters, assume that the E-norm is the only norm in the
society and that there exist two types of agents: Cold and warm. Cold people ignore the
E-norm and just care for their material payoff. Therefore, the utility of any such player at
node z is given by
ui(z) = xi(z).
On the contrary, warm people have internalized the E-norm and suffer a cost when vi-
olating it, to be interpreted as a painful emotion. Furthermore, the intensity of the emotion
depends inversely on the number of transgressors. Thus, a warm deviator feels happier if
every player deviates than if she is the only deviator. One can interpret these assumptions
as modelling the effects of shame on preferences. In effect, in Lo´pez-Pe´rez (2005) we
provide psychological evidence and argue that a deviation from an internalized norm trig-
gers shame and that shame intensity is strongly correlated with inferiority feelings -e.g.,
on how one’s actions compare with others’.
To formalize this, let R(z) designate the set of players that respected the norm in the
history of z. Namely, R(z) includes all players who made choices consistent with the
norm or no choice at all in the history of z. Further, let r(z) denote the cardinality of set
R(z). Given all this, a typical warm player’s utility at z takes the following form:
ui(z) =
 xi(z) if i ∈ R(z).xi(z)− γ · r(z) if i /∈ R(z); (γ > 0).
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Parameter γ measures how intensely warm types have internalized the norm. The
larger it is, the more pain a warm deviator feels ceteris paribus. Importantly, γ is inde-
pendent of the particular deviation oneself made in the past. Although this is indeed an
extreme simplification, we show throughout the paper that it is enough to replicate many
qualitative experimental results.
The E-norm. Let h denote a typical information set, A(h) denote its corresponding
set of available actions, t0 denote a typical initial decision node, that is, any node imme-
diately succeeding Nature’s moves -i.e., random shocks- and X(t0) denote the set of all
x(z) that succeed decision node t0.
Definition 2 Given function
Fεδ = ε ·
∑
i∈N
xi − δ(max
i∈N
xi −min
i∈N
xi), (2)
vector x∗ is an (ε, δ)-fairmax distribution of a material game if x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈X(t0)
Fεδ for
at least one node t0. A path connecting node t0 and one of its (ε, δ)-fairmax distributions
is an (ε, δ)-fairmax path of the material game.
Assuming ε, δ > 0, function Fεδ depends positively on the social efficiency of x -
measured as the sum of monetary payoffs- and negatively on the degree of inequality
embodied in x. In what follows, and given two real numbers a and b, Fab designates
function Fεδ when ε = a, and δ = b.
Unless otherwise noted, we normalize the efficiency parameter ε to one and keep δ
strictly positive but smaller than one. Assumption 1 > δ indicates that social efficiency
is relatively more important than equality. To simplify the exposition, we refer in what
follows to a (1, δ)-fairmax distribution and a (1, δ)-fairmax path as a ‘fairmax distribution’
and a ‘fairmax path’, respectively.
To apply the E-norm to any material game, start by finding all its fairmax paths.6 Once
this task has been completed, two cases are distinguished:
6Infinite material games may have no fairmax distribution. Suppose, for example, that t0 is such that
X(t0) consists of all vectors (x1, x2) such that x1 + x2 = 1, except x = (1/2, 1/2). It is trivial then that
no distribution maximizes function F1δ over X(t) when δ 6= 0. All the material games we consider in
the applications have at least one fairmax distribution. For completeness, however, one may assume that
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(i) If information set h has at least one node on a fairmax path, the E-norm selects all
actions of A(h) that belong to a fairmax path.
(ii) Otherwise, the E-norm selects the whole set A(h).
In other words, unless one is certain that a deviation from a fairmax path has happened,
the E-norm commends any action pointing, from any node on a fairmax path, towards one
of the available fairmax distributions. On the contrary, if someone knows that a deviation
has occurred then the E-norm allows any available move. This latter feature is indeed
extreme but it is enough to get our results and simplifies much the analysis. In Lo´pez-
Pe´rez (2005), alternative, more sophisticated norms are described.
To illustrate how to apply the E-norm, consider the material game at Figure 1. Note
first that, since there are no random shocks, this material game has just one initial decision
node -the upper one. In addition, there is clearly only one fairmax distribution, that is, (5,
5) and two terminal nodes with that associated distribution. Consequently, there are two
fairmax paths. One of them consists just of action r whereas the other consists of actions l
and R. This implies that the E-norm selects both actions l and r at the initial decision node,
action R at player 2’s information set and both actions l’ and r’ at the lower node -here the
norm selects all available actions because this node does not belong to any fairmax path.
Figure 1: Two Fairmax Paths
For another example, take a two-player material game in which players choose si-
multaneously between two actions and material payoffs have the same structure as utility
the E-norm allows any move at any h of a material game with no fairmax distribution. For an alternative,
consult Lo´pez-Pe´rez (2005).
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payoffs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Thus, if both players choose the cooperative
move then distribution (b, b) ensues, each player gets a material payoff of m if they de-
fect, and a lone cooperator (defector) gets zero (t), where t > b > m > 0. Trivially,
(b, b) is the unique fairmax distribution and, consequently, mutual cooperation conforms
the unique fairmax path. Thus, the E-norm selects the cooperative move at each player’s
information set. The reader is encouraged to think of other examples.
To finish, it is worthy to mention the ideas that are buried in the E-norm. First, agents
see distributive justice or fairness as positively depending on social efficiency and equal-
ity. Second, if the mover at h knows that every previous mover complied then the E-norm
suggests any action pointing towards a feasible fairmax distribution. Now, a player at h
may be uncertain about previous play. In that case, the norm praises to put one’s faith
on any previous mover, and play as if one knew that every previous mover respected the
E-norm. Finally, if the mover at h knows that at least one deviation has taken place then
any action becomes commendable.
Players’ Information. Equilibrium Concept. To explain some experimental results,
it is necessary to assume that each player’s type is private knowledge. That is, prior to the
start of any game Nature draws players independently from a population with a binomial
distribution over the set of types. Let µ denote the objective probability of being a warm
agent.
Assuming that µ is common knowledge, we may use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) as a solution concept. A PBE consists of a probability assessment (beliefs) over
the nodes of each player’s information sets and a strategy profile. Assessments reflect
what the player moving at the corresponding information set believes has happened before
reaching it. They must be, to the extent possible, consistent with Bayesian updating on
the hypothesis that the equilibrium strategies have been used to date. In addition, any
player’s strategy in a PBE must be sequentially rational. That is, everybody must choose
optimally at any of her information sets given her beliefs at that set and the fact that future
play will be governed by the equilibrium strategies.
In our model, importantly, beliefs do not play any practical role at information sets out
of a fairmax path. That is, once a ”bad” action has taken place and that becomes common
12
knowledge, beliefs about the type of the opponent are unimportant to explain behavior.
Because of this, we will not mention such beliefs when describing a PBE. Further, this fact
considerably reduces the number of equilibrium strategy profiles in many games, making
the behavioral predictions of the model very precise.
Though most results assume common priors, it is convenient sometimes to relax this
and posit heterogeneous priors.7 Let µi denote the belief player i has about µ so that
beliefs may be heterogeneous -i.e., µi 6= µj for some i 6= j- and mistaken -i.e., µi 6= µ.
To simplify matters, we also assume that all players believe (maybe incorrectly) that priors
are homogeneous and correct. More formally, if player i believes µi then i also holds the
belief that µi is common knowledge. McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) called a hypothesis
of this sort an Egocentric model. This assumption is tractable and convenient because
it does not require us to define a new solution concept. In effect, as player i believes
that all players have common priors µi, we still predict that she will play according to a
PBE of the game with common priors µi. To obtain behavioral predictions for any game,
therefore, we will first find its PBEs as if priors were common and then we will discuss
informally how belief heterogeneity affects players’ behavior.
4 Explaining Experimental Evidence (I)
In this section we use the model to explain experimental evidence coming from a number
of games. In addition, we will provide some tentative answers to three questions: (1)
How well does the E-norm approximate the actual moral standards that some subjects
take to the lab? (2) What are the factors that explain norm compliance in one-shot games
if deviations cannot be punished? and (3) Do rates of norm compliance at h when (a) the
opponent has made no choice up to h differ from those when (b) the opponent has been
active and compliant up to h?
7Some experimental evidence supports this point of view. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991), McKelvey and
Palfrey (1992), Offerman et al (1996) and Sonnemans et al (1999) are some examples. Offerman et al
(1996, pp. 838-839) remark that to explain their results ”Not only is an altruism component needed in the
utility function [...], but also an equilibrium concept which relaxes the assumption of accurate expectations”.
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4.1 On Individual Decision Problems: Efficiency and Equality Matter
It is convenient to begin by applying our model in the simplest scenario: An individual
decision problem with externalities. In general terms, we predict that cold agents choose
the allocation that maximizes monetary earnings whereas warm agents choose the same
allocation that cold ones if their guilt parameter γ is sufficiently low and the fairmax
distribution that gives them a highest monetary payoff otherwise.8 To understand this
latter result, the reader should recall that passive players -i.e., those who make no choice
in the game- belong to set R(z) for any z. This implies that any deviation carries an
internal punishment.
Let us begin by considering the so-called Dictator game: One subject, endowed with
a sum of money M , must decide how much of that money to transfer to another subject.
The unique fairmax distribution is equal sharing. Hence, cold agents give nothing whereas
warm ones give half of the cake if γ is larger than M
2
and nothing if γ is smaller than M
2
-they are indifferent if γ equals M
2
. In other words, warm people follow their principles if
that is not too costly.
Experimental results on the Dictator game -see Camerer (2003), pp.57-58, for an ex-
tensive survey- are somewhat sensitive to the degree of anonymity enjoyed by subjects
when choosing, and the wording of instructions. Nonetheless, one may reasonably con-
tend that (i) the average offer is around 0.25M , (ii) an average of 35-40% of the partici-
pants give nothing, and (iii) there are virtually no offers above 50% of the stake. Result
(iii) is clearly replicated by our model, whereas results (i) and (ii) are consistent if we
assume that µ and γ take appropriate values.9
Our predictions depend heavily on the values of the efficiency parameter ε and the
inequality parameter δ- function (2). To illustrate this, assume for a moment ε = 1 and
δ = 0. Since any monetary allocation in the dictator game is (1, 0)-fairmax, the model
8Hence, marginal changes in parameter γ may produce radical switches in warm agents’ behavior. This
unrealistic feature disappears if we assume that the intensity of the internal punishment conveniently de-
pends on the particular deviation a warm agent does. We have investigated this issue in Lo´pez-Pe´rez (2005).
9However, our model fails to provide an accurate picture of the actual distribution of offers, which
are usually scattered along the interval [0, M/2] and not concentrated on the extremes. See the previous
footnote to this respect.
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then forecasts that no type of player gives any money. If, on the contrary, one assumes
ε = 0 and δ = 1, equal sharing is the only (0, 1)-fairmax distribution and predictions
coincide with those when ε = 1 and 0 < δ < 1.
Therefore, the standard dictator game does not discriminate between a formulation
based on function F01 and the one we use throughout the paper, based on F1δ for 0 < δ <
1. In contrast, the ingenious design of Andreoni and Miller (2002) allows for that. In their
dictator game experiments, transfers of money were multiplied by a factor that differed
from session to session and was common knowledge. In one session, for instance, the
factor was equal to 3 so that a transfer of x units of the dictator’s initial endowment
translated in final earnings of 3x for the receiver. In this session and also when the factor
was equal to 2, a significant number of dictators made transfers such that they ended up
with less money than the receiver. This is consistent with our specification based on F1δ
for 0 < δ < 1 but not with one based on F01. Thus, agents seem to be concerned with
both social efficiency and equality, assigning a larger weight to the first variable.
More experimental data supports this conjecture. In Study 2, Decision 1 of Charness
and Grosskopf (2001), subjects had to choose between (self, other) allocations of pesetas
(625, 625) and (600, 1200).10 Trivially, cold agents should choose the former allocation
whereas warm ones choose the latter, efficient one if γ and δ are high and small enough,
respectively, and the former, egalitarian one otherwise. Charness and Grosskopf (2001)
report that only 33.3% of the subjects (N=108) chose the egalitarian allocation.
Additionally, in their Study 2, Decision 3, the same subjects received 600 pesetas and
had to choose any payoff for another participant between 300 and 1200 pesetas. 74.1% of
the subjects chose 1200 pesetas -i.e., the only fairmax distribution. Only 10.2% of them
chose opponent’s earnings equal to 600 pesetas -i.e., the egalitarian distribution.
Let us now compare our predictions with those from other models. For instance, Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Falk and Fischbacher (forthcom-
ing) assume inequity averse players with no efficiency concerns. It should be intuitively
10At the exchange rate of the moment, one US dollar was around 150 pesetas. Each participant took
decisions in three different problems but was paid for only one of those problems, chosen at random at the
end of the session.
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clear why those models are inconsistent with the evidence cited previously. The same
occurs with Levine (1998)’s model of altruism and spitefulness, at least if we take the
distribution of types that Levine posits. Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) are also inconsistent with the above mentioned data because they predict that no
agent sacrifices her own material payoff to reward a dummy player -this is true at least
for the simplest version of Rabin (1993). On the contrary, Charness and Rabin (2002) is
largely consistent, thus being closest to our model.11
Charness and Rabin (2002) also report abundant experimental evidence that contra-
dicts a utility model based exclusively on (linear) inequity aversion and material interest.
In game Berk23 of Charness and Rabin (2002), for instance, subjects choose between
(self, other) allocations of US dollars (2, 8) and (0, 0). Our model predicts that all agents
choose the first allocation and this is exactly the actual result. On the contrary, Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) predict that a significant proportion of
subjects choose (0, 0). Levine (1998) also predict that.
In game Barc2 of Charness and Rabin (2002), subjects choose between (self, other)
allocations of pesetas (400, 400) and (375, 750). Warm players choose the second alloca-
tion if γ is high enough whereas cold agents choose the first allocation. On the opposite,
inequity aversion models predict that all agents choose the first allocation. It turned out
that 50% of the agents chose the first allocation. In the same line, Charness and Rabin
(2002) show that 69% of the participants choose (Self, Other) allocations of dollars of (4,
7.5,) over (4, 4).
To sum up, the E-norm that we postulate seems a rather accurate approximation to the
distributive concerns that a significant proportion of the subjects bring to the laboratory.
Furthermore and since most of the remaining subjects seem to act selfishly, our model is
also consistent with their behavior.
11Defining a fairmax distribution as an allocation maximizing function Q(x) =
∑
i∈N
xi + τmin
i∈N
{xi},
where 0 < τ , seems a more natural extension of Charness and Rabin’s approach. However, such formulation
gives similar results to ours, at least in two-player games.
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4.2 Norm compliance without punishment threats
People respect norms in nonrepeated interactions even if transgressions cannot be pun-
ished and if compliance is contrary to material interest. This section explores what factors
affect norm compliance in such settings. Intuitively, a warm player will obey the E-norm
-and, by extension, any other norm- if two conditions hold.
First, she must have internalized the E-norm with enough intensity. In effect, warm
agents suffer a psychological cost if they deviate from the E-norm. Nevertheless, if the ex-
pected material benefits of deviating are sufficiently high to overcome the expected pang
-which depends, among other factors, on parameter γ- she may succumb to the temptation
and deviate. Consequently norm compliance requires sufficiently strong convictions.
Second, she must believe that sufficiently many other players will comply as well.
This follows from the fact that the psychological cost of deviating depends directly on the
number of norm followers, and means that norm compliance follows a reciprocal logic.
Let us also remark that expectations that the others will comply subtly depend on one’s
expectations about the other players’ types. Believing that player B is cold suffices to
infer that B will indeed deviate. On the contrary, believing that B is warm is not enough
to sustain the belief that B will comply. We will come back to this point later.
To illustrate all those points, consider a two-player material game in which players 1
and 2 must choose simultaneously positive numbers q1 and q2, respectively. As a result,
player i gets a monetary reward xi = Kqi − qiqj − q2i , whereK is a positive number and
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. As the reader may have noticed, this is a Cournot duopoly game in
which firms’ marginal costs take a common, constant value c and demand is linear, that
is, p = M − Q, where M is a constant (M > c), p denotes the price, and Q the sum of
quantities produced by each firm. In this setting, K = M − c.
Standard optimization techniques show that the sum of monetary rewards is maxi-
mized when q1+ q2 = K2 . Moreover, each player gets the same material payoff if q1 = q2.
Therefore the unique fairmax distribution of this game is implemented when both players
choose qF = K4 , and that is what the E-norm commends.
When do players respect the E-norm? A first point to make in this respect is that no
player will do that if she does not expect the opponent to comply as well. Basically, this
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occurs because producing qF is never in the firms’ material interest -a standard textbook
result shows that if the firm is selfish then qF is a strictly dominated strategy. Conse-
quently, cold firms will never produce qF , and warm ones will only do if they expect the
opponent to produce qF as well.
Proposition 1 A strategy profile in which both cold and warm players choose qNC = K3
is a PBE for any prior µ. This is the only PBE strategy profile in which both types deviate
from qF = K4 .
Proof. Cold agents always seek to maximize material reward xi = Kqi − qiqj − q2i . The
same is true for warm agents if the opponent deviates from the norm (qj 6= K4 ). Fixing
qj, one may show by standard optimization techniques that maximization of xi requires
qi =
K−qj
2
. Now, given the symmetry of the problem, both players should make the same
choice at equilibrium. Hence, we have q1 = q2 = K3 .
Production level qNC corresponds to the textbook Nash-Cournot prediction when both
firms are self-interested -i.e., cold. Further, note that this equilibrium exists for any µ and,
in particular, for µ = 1, that is, in a complete information game played by two warm
agents. Since warm types follow norms reciprocally, mutual distrust -i.e., the mutual ex-
pectation that the opponent will not comply- destroys any respect for the norm. Assuming
then that warm types trust each others, does an equilibrium exist?
Proposition 2 A strategy profile in which warm players choose qF = K4 and cold ones
qC = θqF , where θ = 4−µ3−µ , is a PBE strategy profile if 4(3− µ)
√
µγ ≥ K.
Proof. We show first that cold agents play a best-response. Expected utility of playing qi
is given by
µ(Kqi − qiqF − q2i ) + (1− µ)(Kqi − qiqC − q2i ) (3)
or, alternatively, qipi−q2i where pi = K−µqF−(1−µ)qC . Differentiating qipi−q2i with
respect to qi and equating that to zero, we get as a necessary (and sufficient) condition for
maximum that qi = pi2 = qC .
To prove that warm agents play a best response as well, we first compute their expected
utility of playing qF . For that, and since they follow the norm and feel no remorse, it
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suffices to substitute qF for qi at expression (3) so that one gets that expected payoff
equals qFpi − q2F = q2F (2θ − 1).
Suppose now that a warm agent deviates from qF . Her expected utility is then qipi −
q2i − µγ and the best she can do is producing qi = pi2 , hence getting an expected payoff of
pi2
4
− µγ = θ2q2F − µγ. It follows that playing qF is optimal if
q2F (2θ − 1) ≥ θ2q2F − µγ. (4)
And some algebra proves inequality (4) to be equivalent to 4(3− µ)√µγ ≥ K.
As a first remark, note that this equilibrium exists only if parameter γ is large enough.
Second, we may now introduce the Egocentric model to discuss informally how hetero-
geneous priors affect norm compliance. Intuitively, only those warm players who have a
large enough prior will follow the norm. More precisely, if i is a warm firm with priors
µi, she might produce qF only if 4(3−µi)
√
µiG ≥ K. Finally, heterogeneous priors also
affect cold firms’ choices. To see that, observe that because θ depends positively on µ,
a cold agent i increases her choice qC = θqF as her prior µi increases. In that way, we
generate some behavioral heterogeneity from belief heterogeneity.
Experimental evidence on the Cournot game is summarized in Holt (1995). Although
results are far from conclusive, they show that a significant number of participants in one-
shot games attempt tacitly to collude, choosing output levels close to the joint-income
maximizing level qF , whereas remaining subjects make quantity choices around the Nash-
Cournot equilibrium. Interestingly, if repetition (with rematching) is allowed, cooperation
tend to vanish with time and most output decisions shift back to the Cournot level. Ap-
parently, participants who have initially large priors tend to update their beliefs and thus
move to the noncooperative equilibrium.
4.3 Active and Passive Players
Most modern models of reciprocity -Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Dufwenberg and Kirschteiger
(2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (forthcoming)- assume that people are, in average, more
generous and willing to sacrifice own material payoff towards those that exhibited kind
behavior in the past than towards passive players that did not perform any action -the reci-
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procity model of Charness an Rabin (2002) is an exception because if a player does not
misbehave then her demerit is zero, as a dummy player’s. The E-norm, on the contrary,
only allows ”unkind behavior” if it is certain that the opponent deviated before. This im-
plies that dummy players are as equally legitimated to receive a kind treatment as active
norm compliers.
To illustrate the differences between our model and other reciprocity models, consider
the mini-trust material game represented at Figure 2. The first mover (the ‘investor’)
chooses either not to trust (move D) or to trust (move T) the second player (the ‘trustee’).
In the first case, the investor gets x monetary units and the trustee gets 0 units. Alterna-
tively, the investor may trust and give the trustee the chance to repay trust (move R) or not
(move A). If trust is repaid, both earn r (> x) monetary units. If trust is not repaid, the
investor gets the ‘sucker’ payoff s (< x) and the trustee earns the highest payment t. To
sum up, we have s < x < r < t. In most experiments, values are chosen so that (r, r) is
the unique fairmax distribution for any δ < 1. We assume that in what follows.
Figure 2: Mini-Trust Material Game.
Consider now two variations of this mini-trust game. In the intentions treatment player
1 is active and she effectively chooses her move whereas in the random treatment player
1 is passive and her move is decided by Nature -e.g., with the flip of a coin. Note that
the unique fairmax path of the random treatment simply consists of action R -recall that a
fairmax path always starts at an initial decision node and the only such node in the random
treatment is the trustee’s node- whereas the only fairmax path of the intentions treatment
is formed by moves T and R. Suppose then that player 2 is asked to move, will he behave
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differently in each treatment? The answer is negative.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium and independently of the treatment, cold trustees choose A
whereas warm ones choose R if γ is high enough and A otherwise.
Proof. Cold movers go for the highest material payoff so that they play A. Since the
E-norm commends trustees to move R in both treatments, warm trustees comply if the
utility of playing R is larger than that of playing A, that is, r > t− γ.
Let us compare with other models. Consequentialistic models as the standard one
(homo economicus), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Charness
and Rabin (2002) predict no behavioral difference between both treatments. On the con-
trary and as we stated above, models of intention-based reciprocity predict a significant
decay in repay in the random treatment. Levine (1998) also predicts some decay because
trusting in the intentions treatment signals benevolence, which is rewarded, whereas the
random treatment does not allow this kind of type-selection.
Experimental evidence seems to be consistent with our model. Dufwenberg and
Gneezy (2000) report data from an experimental Lost Wallet game which is very simi-
lar to our mini-trust game. The main differences are that player 2 faces a continuum of
choices (more precisely, he plays a dictator game with stake size 2r) if player 1 trusts him
and that x is larger than r in some treatments (but x < 2r), changes that are inconsequen-
tial for our model. They compare second movers’ choices with data from a pure dictator
game with stake size 2r and do not reject the hypothesis that both sets of data come from
the same distribution. Since a pure dictator game can be seen as a particular case of
our random treatment, this is plainly consistent with proposition 3. Charness and Rabin
(2002), Offerman (2002), and Cox and Deck (2005) report similar results.12 Finally, and
contrary again to reciprocity models -except that of Charness and Rabin (2002)- but con-
sistent with ours, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) also show that second movers’ payback
is uncorrelated with player 1’s outside option x.
12Still, there is not a conclusive answer in this regard because some experimental papers report opposite
results. Fehr and Schmidt (2002) and Camerer (2003, pp. 89-90) provide useful discussions and more
references on positive reciprocity.
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5 Anger and Punishment
We assume that only warm agents -i.e., those who have internalized the E-norm- display
anger. This hypothesis is somewhat speculative, although there is some supporting evi-
dence coming from Burnham (1999). In this experiment, subjects played a constrained
ultimatum game where the only two offers were either $5 or $25 out of $40. Moreover,
subjects’ testosterone levels were measured using saliva samples. Now, it is well known
that high levels of testosterone are correlated with aggressive behavior. Therefore it is
not surprising that subjects with high testosterone levels were relatively more likely to
reject the $5 offer. But Burnham (1999) shows something more: Subjects with high lev-
els of testosterone were also relatively more likely to make an offer of $25. This kind of
correlations are consistent with our model.
Hence, one only needs to introduce some changes in warm agents’ utility function,
which is now given by
Ui(z) =

xi(z) if R(z) ≡ N
xi(z)− γ · r(z) if i /∈ R(z); (γ > 0)
xi(z)− αmax
j /∈R(z)
xj(z) if R(z) ⊂ N, i ∈ R(z); (1 ≥ α > 0).
Since anger goes associated with a desire to punish the deviator, we model it as
history-dependent spite. Clearly, parameter α measures aggressiveness. Further, and
for simplicity, anger intensity does not depend on the particular deviation that the devi-
ator made, and angry agents focus at the best off deviator. Although all this seems a bit
unrealistic, that does not impede the model of explaining much qualitative evidence. We
maintain other assumptions of the model of prosocial behavior.13
13One may wonder whether previous results, obtained without the anger assumption, still hold. With a
small caveat, the answer is positive for two reasons. First, if a deviation from the E-norm occurs in any of
the games we studied then the action that maximizes the material payoff of the nondeviator also minimizes
the deviator’s material payoff. Hence, an angry player would make the same choices as a selfish one -note
that this is no longer true for the games that we study in what follows. Second, if no deviation has taken
place there is no place for anger, except as an expected emotion. Now, if someone expects the opponent to
deviate then she will be less willing to respect the norm, because she expects to be angry, which is painful.
To respect the norm, therefore, warm people require a larger parameter γ or a larger prior µi. Except for
this quantitative differences, previous results still hold.
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5.1 Explaining Experimental Evidence (II): The Ultimatum Game
In this sequential material game player 1 (the ‘proposer’) is provisionally allocatedM > 0
monetary units and has to propose how to divide that money between her and player 2 (the
‘responder’). Given any proposal of sharing (x1, M−x1), the responder can either accept
or reject. If he accepts, he gets M − x1 and the proposer gets x1. If he rejects, both get
nothing.
Figure 3: Mini-ultimatum material game.
Having a continuum of offers does not change our predictions. Thus, we have repre-
sented at Figure 3 a reduced version of the ultimatum material game in which player 1
has only two choices available: ‘Unfair’ (u) and ‘fair’ (f ). The former choice consists of
an offer of (1−ρ)M monetary units to player 2, where ρ is a number in the interval [0, 1].
In turn, choice f consists of a proposal of equal sharing and it is thus consistent with the
E-norm. Player 2 can either accept (A) or reject (R) -note that if player 1 offers u then the
E-norm allows player 2 to choose both A and R, whereas if player 1 chooses f the E-norm
only allows acceptance.
Proposition 4 For any common priors µ and almost any ρ, the mini-ultimatum game
has a unique PBE strategy profile. A warm responder always accepts the equal sharing
whereas he accepts an offer of (1 − ρ)M if ρ < 1
1+α
and rejects if ρ > 1
1+α
. A cold
responder accepts any offer if ρ > 0. A warm proposer’s choice depends on the values of
γ and ρ:
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ρ < 1
2
then she offers the equal sharing.
1
2
< ρ < 1
1+α
then she offers u if γ < M(2ρ−1)
2
and f otherwise.
1
1+α
< ρ then she offers u if γ < M [(1−µ)2ρ−1]
2
and f otherwise.
Finally, a cold proposer offers u if ρ and µ are large and small enough, respectively,
and the equal sharing otherwise.
Proof. Clearly, the unique fairmax distribution of this game is equal sharing. Therefore,
any type of player 2 accepts offer f. Offering u makes a warm responder angry so that he
accepts u only if
(1− ρ)M − αρM > 0.
Trivially, a cold responder accepts u for any ρ > 0.
Consider now a cold proposer. If 1
1+α
> ρ > 1
2
, offer u is always accepted and gives
more money to the proposer than offer f. Thus, she offers u. For analogous reasons, she
offers f if ρ ≤ 1
2
. Suppose then that ρ > 1
1+α
so that offer u is not accepted by a warm
responder. In that case cold proposers offer u if (1− µ)ρM > 0.5M , that is, if 2ρ−1
2ρ
> µ,
and f otherwise.
To finish, assume that player 1 is warm. The 50-50 offer is clearly optimal if ρ ≤ 1
2
.
Finally, offering u gives ρM − γ units of utility if 1
1+α
> ρ > 1
2
and (1 − µ)ρM − γ
units of expected utility if ρ > 1
1+α
. Simple algebraic manipulations prove that a warm
proposer’s strategy is optimal.14
The mini-ultimatum game, in its simplicity, shows many of the implications of our
model regarding punishment. First, warm people punish -i.e., reject an offer- because
they feel angry at violators of the E-norm. Second, angry responders trade off their desire
for revenge and their material interest. Note that rejecting an offer costs (1 − ρ)M , that
is, the amount of the offer. As ρ decreases, the cost of punishment increases, and that ex-
plains why warm responders do not reject very large unfair offers. The threshold depends
crucially on the aggressiveness parameter α.
14This proposition holds for almost any ρ.More than one equilibrium exists if ρ = 11+α (ρ = 0) because
warm (cold) responders are then indifferent between accepting or rejecting the unfair offer. The interested
reader may easily find those equilibria.
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The previous points are consistent with empirical evidence. Table 1 shows data re-
ported in Slonim and Roth (1998) from one ultimatum game in which the stake size was
1500 Slovak Crowns (Sk), valued almost 48.5$ at the exchange rate of that moment. For
instance, 32.4% of all offers were in the offer range [40- 45) -i.e., each of them was larger
or equal than 40% of the stake and smaller than 45% of the stake- and 4.9% of these of-
fers were rejected. Consistent with our prediction, low offers are frequently rejected, and
the probability of rejection tends to decrease as the offer increases. This result has been
replicated in many other ultimatum game experiments.15
With respect to the proposer’s behavior, our model predicts that she will never offer
more than half of the cake, which is basically consistent with experimental evidence.
Moreover, the precise offer a proposer makes depends on her type, parameters α and γ,
the size of the cakeM , and initial priors µ. Let us consider each one separately.
The proposer’s type and parameter γ largely influence her degree of norm compliance.
To make this point clear, assume for a moment that warm players may differ on the degree
of internalization of the E-norm so that each one is characterized by a particular γi. In that
case, warm proposers with a sufficiently large γi would choose equal sharing -note that
one does not need to change proposition 4 to get this result. On the other hand, cold and
weak-willed warm proposers -i.e., those with a small γi- tend to choose meaner offers, if
available.
Nevertheless, if the amount of money M at play is large enough, even a large pa-
rameter γi might not be enough to offset the material benefits of deviating from the fair
sharing. In other words, the larger the size of the stake, the meaner (in percentage) the
average offer. In any case, this should not be overemphasized: Experimental evidence
shows that changes in stakes have small effect on proposals.16 Maybe this is due to a
strong internalization of values (high γ).
Notice that, interestingly, our model predicts a positive correlation between the offers
15See Camerer [2003] or Gu¨th [1995] for evidence on this. Note that one could easily introduce more
heterogeneity regarding anger parameter α. If conveniently modelled, this idea could indeed explain why
offers are scattered.
16Notice incidentally that actual responders’ thresholds change also modestly with stake changes. Evi-
dence on those two points is surveyed in Camerer (2003, pp. 60-62).
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF SLONIM AND ROTH (1998)
Percentages of offers and rejections by range of offers
Offer ranges Offers Rejections
> 50 7.2 0
= 50 30.8 1.3
(45-50) 6 0
(40-45) 32.4 4.9
(35-40) 5.2 0
(30-35) 7.2 11.1
(25-30) 3.2 37.5
< 25 8 60
that a same agent would make in the dictator and the ultimatum games, specially if the
stake is not big. Although we are not aware of any within-subjects experiment testing this,
we can at least compare ultimatum and dictator game data coming from between-subjects
designs. The two most important results are that offers are less concentrated in the dictator
game than in the ultimatum game, and that average offer is smaller in the dictator game.
Our model is consistent with those facts and explains them because of the impossibility
to punish deviators in the dictator game.
As we saw before, parameter α determines warm responders’ acceptance threshold.
The larger α is, the larger such threshold is. Well informed proposers who pretend to
deviate from the E-norm should take this into account and, consequently, adjust their
offers to their beliefs about α and µ. In fact, it is a robust experimental fact that there are
almost no offers below 0.2M . This seems to indicate that deviant proposers expect a high
proportion of aggressive responders.
To illustrate the previous point more clearly, consider the model with heterogeneous
and egocentric beliefs. Intuitively, we predict that cold and warm proposers make large
offers whenever her priors µi surpass a certain level, which is different for cold and warm
types. Now, in almost any study the vast majority of offers is in the interval 40%−50%.A
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possible interpretation is that subjects come to the lab with rather large priors µi. In fact,
the available evidence indicates that proposers tend to overestimate the actual proportion
of people that reject unfair offers -i.e., parameter µ.17
5.2 The Mini-Best-Shot Game
In this game, player 1 moves either ‘left’ (l) or ‘right’ (r). Player 2 observes her move and
then either ‘accepts’ (A) or ‘rejects’ (R). Figure 4 shows its material game tree, in which
ρM > (1−ρ)M that is, ρ > 1
2
. A remarkable feature of this material game is that there is
no Pareto efficient allocation that gives both players equal monetary payoffs. As a result,
this material game has two fairmax paths: One leads to allocation [ρM, (1 − ρ)M ], the
other one to allocation [(1− ρ)M,ρM ]. This largely drives our predictions.
Figure 4: Mini-Best-Shot Material Game
Proposition 5 The mini-best-shot game has a unique PBE strategy profile. Independently
of their types, player 1 chooses ‘right’, and Player 2 rejects ‘left’ and accepts ‘right’.
Proof. Player 2 accepts ‘right’ and rejects ‘left’ because that is consistent with the E-norm
and maximizes material payoff. For the same reasons, player 1 offers ‘right’.
17See Camerer (2003, p. 56) for a brief discussion of this point and some references. A natural question
is whether more experienced subjects would adjust their strategies. The answer is positive: There is some
evidence that offers slightly fall over time if repetition -with rematching- is allowed. Camerer (2003, pp.
59-60) also discusses this problem.
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The mini-best-shot game shows how the model works in games with more than one
fairmax path. The player that chooses at a decision node in which two or more fairmax
paths diverge has a strategic advantage: She can choose the fairmax path that favours her
most without making the opponents angry. Models of inequity aversion, on the contrary,
predict that some of the responders will not accept ‘right’ because the ensuing distribution
is disadvantageous for the responder.
Prasnikar and Roth (1992) study a best-shot game with a richer strategy space than
the one we analyze here. Their results, however, are still consistent with our predictions.
This is specially true concerning proposers. On the other hand, some responders prefer
(0, 0) than [ρM, (1− ρ)M ] -something that our model cannot explain. Does this indicate
that they are inequity averse? We will deal more in detail with this issue in the following
subsection. In the meanwhile, however, it is convenient to note that Prasnikar and Roth
(1992) also study behavior in a comparable ultimatum game, and they show that the rate
of rejection of offer [ρM, (1− ρ)M ] is significatively larger in the ultimatum game.
The divergence in results cannot be explained by inequity aversion models because
they assume consequentialistic preferences -i.e., the only thing that agents care about is
how material resources are distributed, not how this distribution is achieved. Our model,
on the contrary, explains the divergence because offer [ρM, (1 − ρ)M ] constitutes a de-
viation from the E-norm in the ultimatum game, where the equal sharing is feasible, but
not in the best-shot game. Consequently, such offer makes the second mover angry in the
ultimatum but not in the best-shot game. We will also consider more in detail this point
in what follows.
5.3 Path-Dependent Preferences: The Choice Set Matters
Warm player’s utility function is path-dependent because its functional form changes with
previous history, more precisely, it changes when someone deviates from an internalized
norm. Hence, our model differs radically from consequentialistic models in which utility
only depends on the material outcome of an interaction: One’s feelings in two different
games may differ even if the material outcome coincides.
Path-dependency is crucial to understand violence and conflict. One crucial idea in
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this respect is that the choice set matters: An action with equal material consequences
may be perfectly right in one setting but not in another in which, due to a larger choice
set, the norms at work commend different behavior. To illustrate this, imagine one firm
and a trade union setting wages: A wage increase that is fair during a recession may
be completely insulting during a period of expansion -see Kahneman et al (1986) for
evidence on this. As a result, workers’ reactions in each case -e.g., the probability of
going to strike- may differ.
As another illustration, consider the mini-ultimatum material games represented at
Figures 5a and 5b. Player 1 can either offer ‘left’ (l) or ‘right’ (r) and player 2 can accept
(A) or reject (R) any offer. In both games, ‘left’ consists of an offer to give eight and two
monetary units to player 1 and 2, respectively. In game (5/5), ‘right’ is an offer to share
equally ten monetary units while in game (10/0) ‘right’ consists of a demand of the whole
cake for player 1.
(a) (5/5) Material Game. (b) (10/0) Material Game.
Figure 5:
Consider first player 2’s behavior if he is offered ‘left’. Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher
(2003) find that 44.4% of the (8, 2) offers were rejected in game (5/5) while only 8.9% of
those were rejected in game (10/0).18 Furthermore, proposers were able to anticipate the
different rates of rejection. Around 30% of the proposers offer (8,2) in game (5/5) while
almost 100% of the proposers offer (8, 2) in game (10/0).
18Brandts and Sola` (2001) report similar results. See Fehr and Schmidt (2002) for more evidence and
references on the topic.
29
In (5/5) game, our model predicts that warm responders reject left -assuming α is
high enough- and accept right. The reason is simple: Offering (8, 2) in this game is an
unfair move because there exists a more fair offer -the equal sharing. Thus, offering (8,
2) activates anger and provokes rejection. Cold responders, on the other hand, accept any
offer. Therefore, a cold proposer’s move depends on her initial expectation µi that the
opponent is warm. She offers (8, 2) if µi is small enough and (5, 5) otherwise. Finally,
warm proposers offer the equal split if γ is large enough.
Contrary to (5/5) game, the fairmax distribution of game (10/0) is (8, 2). Hence, offer
(8, 2) is always accepted and this explains why offer (8, 2) is rejected at different rates in
each game.19 On the other hand, an offer of (10, 0) is unfair and very cheap to punish so
that it is always rejected by warm responders, whereas cold ones are indifferent between
accepting or rejecting it.
To sum up, the whole set of alternatives is important because people determine what
is fair by looking at that set. Consequently, an action may be fair in one context but not
in another one in which a more fair move is feasible. Since anger activates by unfair
moves, we thus have that anger activation and punishment also depend on the initial set
of alternatives.
5.4 Path-Dependence: Responsibility Matters
In our model, responsibility becomes an important variable because sanctions are directed
only towards violators. Suppose, for instance, that vegetable production in a certain re-
gion has been minimal because of low irrigation, and think of two possible scenarios:
19As we noted before, offer (8, 2) is rejected by a small minority of responders in game (10/0) so that our
model is inconsistent with that result. May this phenomenon be due to inequity aversion? To analyze this
point with a bit of detail, consider an individual decision problem in which the chooser must decide between
two (self, other) material allocations: (2, 8) and (0, 0). Note that, from a consequentialistic point of view,
this is exactly the same problem that a responder faces in the (10/0) game if the fair offer is made. However,
and contrary to pure inequity aversion models, some experimental evidence shows that the rate of choice of
allocation (0, 0) differs significatively in both cases -basically, no subject chooses (0, 0) in the non-strategic
setting; see Charness and Rabin (2002) on this. All this seems to indicate that inequity aversion is not the
force motivating rejection of the (8, 2) offer in game (10/0).
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In one, the cause of low irrigation was a heavy drought whereas in the other it was the
incompetence of the agency in charge of the irrigation ditches. Although distributional
consequences -low agricultural incomes- may be identical in both cases, farmers are likely
to anger at the agency in the latter scenario, thus generating conflict, but not in the for-
mer one. In general, unfair outcomes may be the result of Nature moves or third parties’
choices. Economic crisis in little countries, for example, may be caused by policy choices
made by big countries or international institutions. Citizens’ response in this case is likely
to be different that if the crisis is caused by bad economic policy at the domestic level.
It is possible to test in the lab whether responsibility matters or not. Suppose, for
instance, that a computer generates randomly the proposer’s offer in an ultimatum game.
Since the proposer is not responsible of any deviation, the model predicts that no respon-
der rejects (punishes) a randomly chosen offer x. Thus lower rejections rates are predicted
in the computer treatment than in the typical, intentional treatment.
Blount (1995) was the first to provide experimental evidence on this regard.20 Our
model is consistent with Blount’s experimental data. Indeed, there is a significant and
substantial reduction in the acceptance thresholds of responders in the computer treat-
ment.21 Blount also studied rejection rates in case a third party chooses the proposer’s
offer. Interestingly, acceptance thresholds in this condition did not differ significatively
from those in the usual condition. Although this seems inconsistent with our model, we
believe that it can be easily accommodated. When a third party chooses a sharing that
favours either the proposer or the responder, that third party violates the norm of fair-
ness. The responder may then ‘punish’ the third party by rejecting that unfair sharing -of
course, rejection is more likely in case the split favours the proposer because then it is
relatively cheaper.
The concept of responsibility is rather alien to consequentialistic models. Inequity
aversion models as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), for instance,
20Blount’s results are problematic because, among other reasons, subjects were deceived in one of the
treatments. Further research shows, however, that Blount’s qualitative results are not an artifact of the
experimental design. See Fehr and Schmidt (2002) for a discussion.
21Nevertheless, there exists a very small proportion of actual responders that reject low offers in the
random treatment. Again, see Fehr and Schmidt (2002) for a survey on this and related issues.
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predict that if punishment is cheap enough, a relatively well-off agent will get punished
independently that he/she is responsible of any transgression. As a result, they predict
no change in rejection rates between the computer treatment and the typical, intentional
treatment. On the contrary, models of intentions and type-based reciprocity predict some
change.
5.5 Punishment is not a Means to Reduce Inequity
Models of altruistic motives like Charness and Rabin (2002) are unable to explain why
people punish. On the contrary, inequity aversion models -Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)- do provide a rationale: Punishment is a means to reduce
disadvantageous material payoff inequality. For two-player games, this idea has a series
of implications which we will contrast in what follows with ours.
First, inequity averse agents never punish an opponent that gets a lower payment than
oneself. On the opposite, we predict that a warm agent will punish any transgressor (in-
cluding disadvantaged ones) if punishment is cheap enough. As an illustration, consider
the material game represented in Figure 6. Observe that, if given the choice, player 2
may punish the first mover by choosing R. Note also that player 2 gets a larger payoff
than player 1 at any terminal node. Consequently, inequity aversion models predict that
any second mover would play A if given the choice. A rational inequity averse first mover
should then move l in order to get a larger material payoff and reduce disadvantageous
inequity.
Figure 6: Punishing a disadvantaged opponent.
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Unless the inequality parameter δ is very close to one, (5, 120) is the unique fairmax
distribution of this material game so that the E-norm prescribes to play r. Suppose then
that player 1 violates the norm and plays l. If the second mover is warm and his anger
parameter α is large enough, he will punish the first mover. That is, he will play R. As a
result, a rational first mover may decide to play r if her priors µ are large enough.
Another prediction of inequity aversion models is that punishment never takes place
if it is so costly that it does not reduce disadvantageous inequity. Suppose, for example,
that reducing the opponent’s payment in one monetary unit costs exactly one unit as well.
Then no inequity averse agent would punish the other player. On the contrary, we predict
that a very aggressive warm player -i.e., α = 1- would indeed punish a transgressor.
Experimental evidence strongly supports our prediction -see Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher
(2000) for details.
Finally, inequity aversion models predict some punishment towards an advantaged
opponent if it is cheap enough. Since our model predicts no punishment towards non-
transgressors, independently of their relative status, it is clearly at odds with that idea.
Experimental evidence seems to be at conflict too: In previously mentioned game Berk23
of Charness and Rabin (2002) subject B chooses between (B, other) allocations of dollars
(2, 8) and (0, 0). Because punishment -i.e., choosing (0, 0)- reduces inequity, inequity
aversion models predict that a significant proportion of subjects choose (0, 0). Contrary
to that, all participants chose (2, 8). Consult Fehr and Schmidt (2002) for more evidence.
6 Concluding remarks
We have shown that a large body of experimental evidence, including very different phe-
nomena like generous and punishing behavior, may be explained by a relatively simple
utility theory in which agents experience different emotional responses depending on how
they and others act. Roughly speaking, our claim is that aggressive emotions like anger
and moral emotions like or shame are strong psychological forces that enforce reciprocity,
understanding by that concept two things: (1) People adhere to norms if they expect others
to respect them as well, and (2) people punish those who violate binding norms. Further,
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and since these emotions are activated by deviations from the norm, they induce path-
dependent preferences.
Because it is very simple, the E-norm we propose is also too unrealistic. On one side,
a norm that allows anymove once a player transgresses it is a rather eccentric norm. Even
if someone has committed a misdeed, actual norms of fairness still commend to be kind
with those who previously respected them, and that may heavily restrict the set of decent
choices. Another important issue is that societies have norms regulating revenge and
punishment, something that the E-norm does not consider. For instance, proportionality
concerns are widespread -i.e., many people believe that the punishment imposed on a
deviator should be proportional to the damage that her deviation caused (Lex Talionis).
Further, the E-norm has the problem that it is not strategic, that is, it makes prescriptions
at any information set h without taking into account what the mover at h expects others
are subsequently going to do -i.e., their intentions. Due to this, the E-norm may commend
a move that, if the other player is selfish, ends up reaching a very unfair outcome.
To illustrate this, consider the material game tree represented at Figure 7. As (3, 3)
is the only fairmax allocation of this game, the E-norm commends player 1 to move l.
Nevertheless, a cold player 2 would then choose action A so reaching outcome (0, 4),
which is most unfair. We believe that many people would argue that, unless one were sure
enough that the opponent is a well-principled person who plays R, action r is at least as
fair as action l. All this can be introduced in the model.
Figure 7: A Risky Move.
Assuming that the psychological cost triggered by a deviation does not depend on
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the particular deviation one makes is extreme. It seems more reasonable to assume that
such cost grows with the undeserved harm our actions impose on the others. In particular,
actions leading to unfair outcomes that favour the opponent should not induce any remorse
at all -think of an ultimatum game proposer who offers the whole cake to the responder!
Further, one could add a hypothesis of nonlinearity and some heterogeneity which would
be useful, for instance, to replicate the fact that dictator game offers are usually scattered
along the interval [0, M/2].
This paper has concentrated on the study of fairness norms -i.e., norms regulating
behavior in order to reach a fair distribution of material resources. Nevertheless, the
definition of norm that we have given here is general enough to include many other types
of norms. Think of norms regulating dressing, eating, or communication. For instance,
parents instruct their children that telling lies is, most of the cases, a bad act that should
embarrass them if performed. Accordingly, most of us feel badly when breaking that
rule or anger at those who violate it. This emotional responses help to enforce sincere
communication, and this can be easily accommodated within the setting offered by this
paper. On the contrary, other models of social preferences and reciprocity are badly suited
to explain these phenomena because they define a ’bad’ action -if they define it at all- only
by making reference to its expected material consequences; something that, obviously,
communication does not affect.
To finish, the field of application of our model should not be restricted to the lab.
Indeed, social norms and emotions strongly influence human action in many ‘real life’
settings like voting, law compliance, bargaining, team performance, and conflict, to cite a
few. The next step should go in the direction of studying such influence -Lindbeck et al.
(1999) is an example of this line of research.
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